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UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 
 
APPALACHIAN VOICES V. STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD 
912 F.3d 746 (4th Cir. 2019) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
After the Atlantic Coast Pipeline was approved by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and 
the Virginia State Water Control Board, environmental groups 
petitioned the court of appeals to review the Board’s decision. 
Environmental groups argued that the certification given by the 
Virginia State Water Board to the Atlantic Coast Pipeline project was 
arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
found that the Board did not issue the certification arbitrarily and 
capriciously and denied the petition for review.  
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
The Atlantic Coast Pipeline (ACP) was a “proposed interstate 
natural gas pipeline . . . approximately 604 miles long and 42 inches 
in diameter . . . [and] [a]pproximately 307 miles of the ACP would 
traverse the Commonwealth of Virginia.”1  In order to get approval 
for this, the Atlantic Coast Pipeline LLC (Atlantic) had to comply 
with several federal and state laws.2 
Atlantic had to receive authorization from the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) under the Natural Gas Act (NGA).3  
After authorization, FERC then “undertakes a review of the 
environmental impacts of the proposed project under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).4  Then, FERC “coordinates the 
required authorizations, including Virginia’s water quality 
certification under the Clean Water Act (CWA).5  After this, Atlantic 
                                                          
1 Appalachian Voices v. State Water Control Board, 912 F.3d 746, 750 (4th 
Cir. 2019). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
    
168 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 39-1 
needed and received an authorization from the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers.6  Then, Atlantic needed a Section 401 Certification 
through the state.7  The Virginia Department of Environmental 
Quality (DEQ) was the issuing agency for this certification which 
would approve the pipeline to cross wetland, river and streams. 
However, a longer review was necessary for the upland impacts of 
the ACP.8  Seven months later, the DEQ informed the Virginia State 
Water Control Board (Board) that it supported the approval of the 
Upland Certification for the ACP.9   
Upon this certification, environmental groups filed two petitions 
arguing that the Section 401 Upland Certification was arbitrary and 
capricious for four reasons.10  The Board first argued that the groups 
did not have standing but the court disagreed because “petitioners 
successfully establish traceability and redressability given that we 
could vacate the Board’s decision and determine that its decision was 
not based on a reasonable assurance and instead was arbitrary and 
capricious.”11 
 
Holding: 
 
The court of appeals had to determine whether or not the Board 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in granting the section 401 
Certification to the uplands.12  “To survive review under the arbitrary 
and capricious standard, an agency decision must show that the 
agency examined ‘the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory 
explanation for its action including a rational connection between the 
facts found and the choice made.’”13 
The first reason the environmental groups found the Board’s 
certification to be arbitrary and capricious is because the Board 
                                                          
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 751. 
8 Id. at 751–52. 
9 Id. at 752. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 752–53.   
12 Id. at 753. 
13 Id.  
    
Fall 2019       Legal Summaries 169 
reopened the comment period.14  However, the court does not find 
that to be arbitrary and capricious because the comment period was 
“re-opened for the Wetlands and Streams Certification and not the 
Upland Certification at issue in this case.”15  Secondly, the 
environmental groups argued  that the certification was arbitrary and 
capricious because the State did not “conduct a combined effect 
analysis.”16  However, the amount of different certifications, 
approvals, and authorizations that Atlantic had to get for the pipeline 
means that the Board and DEQ did not “duplicate[] the efforts of 
other regulatory bodies.”17  The third argument is that the Board and 
the DEQ should have conducted an antidegradation review and not 
“relied on existing Virginia water quality standards and 
regulations.”18  However, here, the court cites the CWA, which states 
that “‘states have the primary role in promulgating water quality 
standards.’”19  There was no need for the Board or the DEQ to 
conduct a separate antidegradation review.20  Lastly, the court found 
that “the State Agencies’ treatment of karst terrain was not arbitrary 
or capricious because of the conditions imposed on the Section 501 
Upland Certification.”21  “Karst geology refers to geological 
formations of soluble limestone bedrock that creates underground 
water flow systems where the rocks have dissolved and created 
sinkholes, caves and underground springs and rivers.”22  When 
determining whether or not to grant the certification, the Board and 
the DEQ took these concerns about karst terrain into consideration, 
meaning that this does not make the issuance of the certification 
arbitrary or capricious.23 
Ultimately, the Board and the DEQ considered the relevant 
factors when giving the Section 401 Upland Certification, and that is 
                                                          
14 Id. at 754.   
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 756. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 758. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) standard for whether an 
agency action is arbitrary or capricious.24  Therefore, the 
environmental groups’ petition for review was denied.25 
 
Impact:  
 
The impact of Appalachian Voices is yet to be fully realized.  The 
Fourth Circuit, in its holding for the Board, reiterated the standard for 
how an agency can survive review of a decision that is being labeled 
arbitrary and capricious.  Here, the Board survived that attack 
because the agency examined the relevant data and came to an 
explanation for that action.  If the court had found that there was no 
reason for the Board’s findings, then the decision to give the 
certification to Atlantic would have been arbitrary and capricious and 
the court would have held in favor of the environmentalist groups.  
 
CITY OF NEW YORK V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
913 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 2019) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
Three municipalities, the City of New York, Philadelphia, and 
San Francisco, all use the National Instant Criminal Background 
Check System.  This system helps combine information between 
federal agencies and state agencies.  These municipalities sued the 
Department of Defense because the Department was not complying 
with the system.  The district court dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction and the court of appeals affirmed.  
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
The National Instant Criminal Background Check System 
(NICS), is a program managed by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI).26  This program “facilitates information sharing 
                                                          
24 Id. at 759. 
25 Id. 
26 City of New York v. United States Department of Defense, 913 F.3d 423, 
426 (4th Cir. 2019). 
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between federal agencies and local law enforcement officials.”27  
Three different municipalities sued the Department of Defense 
(DOD) because the DOD was not providing the amount of records 
required by the NICS.28  The municipalities wanted more thorough 
compliance, but the district court dismissed the claim because the 
appellants did not have constitutional standing and also “failed to 
establish subject matter jurisdiction under the Administrative 
Procedure Act.”29 
The issue of the DOD not reporting enough information to NICS 
has been an ongoing problem.30  Municipal appellants argue that if 
the “DOD complied with its reporting obligations under the NIAA 
[NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007],” the shooting in 
Sutherland Springs, Texas by a former member of the military could 
have been prevented, because the gunman had been convicted in 
court-martial proceedings and should not have owned a gun.31  The 
municipalities could not sue under the Brady Act or the NIAA, 
because neither “contemplated a separate cause of action to compel 
performance with inter-agency reporting obligations.”32  However, 
the municipalities could sue under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), which “allows an aggrieved party to ‘compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.’”33 
On appeal, the first question the court looked at was “whether the 
municipal appellants have established subject matter jurisdiction 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).”34  The court 
ultimately found that there was “no basis in the APA’s text for such a 
broad incursion into internal agency management.”35  The court 
turned to the definition of agency action which is “‘the whole or a 
part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the 
                                                          
27 Id. at 427.  
28 Id. 
29 Id.  
30 Id. at 429.  
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 430.  
35 Id.  
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equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act’” and is “limited to 
those governmental acts that ‘determine rights and obligations.’”36  
This narrow definition is to “ensure[] that judicial review does not 
reach into the internal workings of the government, and is instead 
properly directed at the effect that agency conduct has on private 
parties.”37  These requirements apply to all challenges of agency 
action.38 
Here, when the municipal appellants want to compel information 
from the DOD to aid their own local government, the court held that 
they failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction.39  An issue is that 
the municipal appellants do not “challenge a discrete agency 
action.”40  In addition, the lack of reporting to NICS is a systemic 
problem that will “likely require expertise in information technology 
and deep knowledge of how military needs intersect with data 
collection.  In other words, it is exactly the sort of ‘broad 
programmatic’ undertaking for which the APA has foreclosed 
judicial review.”41 
 
Holding: 
 
Even though the court decided to reaffirm the dismissal based on 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the fact that there was no 
discrete action in this claim, the court agreed with the municipal 
appellants that “failure to carry out discrete obligations can be subject 
to review.  Government deficiencies do not become non-reviewable 
simply because they are pervasive.”42  It will take years for the DOD 
to implement reporting requirements, and “‘the obvious inability for 
a court to function in such a day-to-day managerial role over agency 
operations is precisely the reason why the APA limits judicial review 
to discrete agency actions.’”43  Ultimately, while the APA does not 
                                                          
36 Id. at 431.   
37 Id.  
38 Id. at 432.  
39 Id. at 432.  
40 Id. at 433. 
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 433.   
43 Id. at 434.   
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permit this sort of judicial supervision, the court commends the 
municipalities for seeking ways to keep their counties safer.44  
Without a discrete action, the case had to be dismissed.45 
 
Impact: 
 
The impact of City of New York is the reaffirmation that the 
judicial branch does not give direct supervision to agencies.  In order 
to rule on an agency action, the action has to be discrete. This 
limitation is placed on the judicial branch because there are not 
enough resources to be able to supervise the many different agencies.  
An appellant cannot simply identify a government action that has had 
a negative impact on them.  Like in the present case, the lack of DOD 
reporting to NICS about former servicemen who should not own 
weapons, could affect law enforcement in these municipalities.  
However, just because the DOD’s actions affected the municipalities 
does not mean that the courts should get involved.   
 
KEELEY V. WHITAKER 
910 F.3d 878 (6th Cir. 2018) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
David Keeley, a lawful permanent resident residing in Ohio, was 
convicted of rape.  The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decided 
that his conviction was an aggravated felony under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA) and Keeley could be removed without 
possibility of relief.  Keeley appealed this decision because Ohio’s 
definition of rape includes digital penetration, which would not be 
considered an aggravated felony under the INA.  The Sixth Circuit 
agreed with Keeley on the basis of statutory interpretation.  
   
Facts and Analysis: 
 
David Keeley was a legal permanent resident living in Ohio, and 
a citizen of the United Kingdom.46  He was convicted of two counts 
                                                          
44 Id. at 436. 
45 Id. 
    
174 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 39-1 
of rape in 2011.47  Because of the two convictions, “the Department 
of Homeland Security charged him as being convicted of an 
aggravated felony under the INA and sought his removal pursuant to 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).”48  Due to this, Keeley could have been 
removed without the possibility of relief because “an aggravated 
felony carries the most severe immigration consequence possible.”49  
In August 2016, an immigration judge found that Keeley’s rape 
conviction in Ohio qualified as an aggravated felony.50  Keeley 
appealed to the BIA, and argued that “his Ohio conviction is not an 
aggravated felony because Ohio’s definition of rape includes digital 
penetration, whereas the INA’s does not.”51  However, the BIA 
argued that the INA’s definition of rape also included digital 
penetration, which meant that Keeley was guilty of an aggravated 
felony, “making him ineligible for the possibility of relief from 
removal.”52  Keeley appealed once more.53 
In order to decide whether Keeley’s rape conviction in Ohio 
could be considered an aggravated felony, the Sixth Circuit made 
three different queries.54  The first was “identify[ing] the minimum 
conduct required for a conviction of rape under the Ohio statute.”55  
The second was “identify[ing] the elements of rape as it is used in the 
INA,” through “the resources at [their] disposal, including the 
common law, state statutes, and the Model Penal Code.”56  Lastly, 
the court considered whether “the minimum conduct criminalized by 
the Ohio statute ‘categorically fits’ within the generic crime.”57 
As to the first point, the Sixth Circuit examined the Ohio rape 
statute to determine the minimum conduct required for a rape 
                                                          
46 Keeley v. Whitaker, 910 F.3d 878, 881 (6th Cir. 2018). 
47 Id.  
48 Id.   
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 881–82.  
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conviction.58  The Ohio rape statute “defines ‘sexual conduct’ to 
include the act of digital penetration.  Digital penetration, therefore, 
is the ‘minimum conduct’ criminalized under the Ohio statute for 
purposes of our inquiry.”59  The second inquiry is more complicated, 
because “Congress did not provide a definition of the term rape” so 
the court “must ‘give the term its ordinary meaning.’”60  Because 
Congress “added rape to the INA as an aggravated felony in 1996,” 
the court analyzed the definition of rape in 1996.61  After examining 
several tribunals’ definitions of rape, including the BIA, the 
common-law crime of rape, state law statutes, and Black’s Law 
Dictionary, the court concluded that “the generic definition of rape 
does not include digital penetration.”62  The court articulated that 
BIA’s decision to change course and include digital penetration in the 
definition of rape “ignored the most important guiding factor to 
statutory interpretation—the language of the statute—which shows 
that Congress did not consider rape and sexual abuse to be 
coextensive.”63  To combine digital penetration with the meaning of 
rape in the 1996 statute “would strip meaning from the statute’s 
words.”64  The court does not analyze the third inquiry because it 
finds fault with the BIA’s interpretation of the term rape in the 
second inquiry.65 
 
Holding: 
 
The court relied on Chevron to arrive at the conclusion that 
Keeley’s rape conviction was not an aggravated felony under the 
INA.66  When interpreting a federal statute, the court must discern 
Congress’ intent.67  Here, “Congress considered rape to be a separate 
                                                          
58 Id. at 882.   
59 Id.   
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 883.   
62 Id.   
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 884.  
65 Id.  
66 Id. 
67 Id.   
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crime from sexual abuse . . . it is undisputed that the generic crime of 
rape in 1996—without considered sexual abuse statutes and 
definitions—did not include digital penetration.”68 
Furthermore, the Government in the present case argued that “the 
BIA’s decision should stand because it avoids an absurd result.”69  
However, the court notes that “the canon against absurd results 
should not be used to create an ambiguity in the text of a statute 
where none exists.”70  While Keeley could not be convicted of an 
aggravated felony pursuant to this interpretation, the court 
acknowledges that “he could still be subject to removal for 
committing a crime involving moral turpitude.”71  
 
Impact: 
 
The immediate impact of Keeley was the court’s refusal to 
categorize Keeley’s rape conviction in Ohio as an aggravated felony 
for the purposes of removal.  The impact over time is the potential 
reiteration of looking to what Congress meant each word to mean at 
the time the statute was written.  Here, for example, the INA’s 
aggravated felony statute was written in 1996.  While modern courts 
would likely include digital penetration in rape statutes, in 1996, 
there was a separate statute for sexual abuse.  The Sixth Circuit 
strictly interpreted the statute. 
 
MONTROIS V. UNITED STATES 
916 F.3d 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2019) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
A group of tax-return preparers filed a class action lawsuit against 
the Internal Revenue Service alleging that the fee to obtain a Preparer 
Tax Identification Number was arbitrary and capricious.  The court 
found that the IRS acted within its authority under the Independent 
                                                          
68 Id.   
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 885.   
71 Id.  
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Offices Appropriations Act and that the decision to implement the fee 
was neither arbitrary nor capricious.   
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
Tax-return preparers prepare tax returns for taxpayers.72  The 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began requiring tax-return preparers 
to obtain “a unique identifying number known as a Preparer Tax 
Identification number, or PTIN.”73  The PTIN had to be renewed 
annually, and the fee to obtain and renew the PTINs was “designed to 
recoup the costs to the agency of issuing and maintaining a database 
of PTINs.”74  The IRS used its authority under the Independent 
Offices Appropriations Act to require a fee, because the Act “allows 
federal agencies to charge fees for services in certain conditions.”75 
This group of tax-return preparers argued that the IRS did not 
have authority under the Independent Offices Appropriations Act to 
charge a fee and also that the decision to implement the fee was 
arbitrary and capricious.  The district court agreed and ordered the 
IRS to stop charging the PTIN fee and also to refund the fees already 
paid.76  The court here disagreed and argued that the IRS did have 
authority under the Act and that the decision to do so was neither 
arbitrary nor capricious.77 
The reason the IRS began to implement regulations on tax-return 
preparers is because it felt that “many taxpayers were being ‘poorly 
served by some tax return preparers’ due to preparers’ inadequate 
education and training as well as deficiencies in the agency’s 
compliance regime.”78  Tax-return preparers do not have to have any 
formal education and anyone can be a registered tax-return payer as 
long as they pass a “background check, pass a competency exam, and 
satisfy continuing education requirements.”79 So, the IRS 
                                                          
72 Montrois v. United States, 916 F.3d 1056, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
73 Id.  
74 Id.   
75 Id.  
76 Id.  
77 Id.   
78 Id. at 1059.  
79 Id.  
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implemented a “credentialing and registration regime for tax-return 
preparers.”80  The IRS also “required preparers to obtain a PTIN and 
renew it annually.”81  Lastly, the IRS “decided it would charge tax-
return preparers a fee of roughly $50 (plus a vendor fee) to obtain 
and renew a PTIN.”82  This fee would cover costs of the technology 
system, and other support needed to evaluate and enforce tax-return 
preparers.83 
The court examines whether or not it has jurisdiction over this 
case and holds that it does have jurisdiction because the tax-return 
preparers were not required “to submit their claims to the IRS before 
bringing this action in federal court.”84   
The tax-return preparers argue that the fee is unlawful for two 
reasons.  First, they argued that “the Independent Offices 
Appropriations Act does not provide statutory authority for the fee.  
Second, they contend that the IRS’s decision to impose the fee was 
arbitrary and capricious.”85 
 
Holding: 
 
The court disagrees with both of these contentions.86  To the first 
argument, the court counters with the fact that under the Independent 
Offices Appropriations Act, the “‘head of each agency . . . may 
prescribe regulations establishing the charge for a service or thing of 
value provided by the agency.’”87  To justify a fee, the agency must 
show that “it provides some kind of service in exchange for the fee . . 
. that the service yields a specific benefit, and . . . that the benefit is 
conferred upon identifiable individuals.”88  The court holds that the 
IRS meets all three requirements.89  The IRS provides “the service of 
                                                          
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 1062.  
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 1062–63. 
89 Id. at 1063.  
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providing tax-return preparers a PTIN.”90  The IRS also provides a 
specific benefit—“the PTIN helps protect tax-return preparers’ 
identities by allowing them to list a number on returns other than 
their social security number.”91  Lastly, the benefit is conferred upon 
identifiable individuals because “[t]ax-return preparers as a group 
qualify as identifiable recipients for purposes of justifying a fee 
assessed under the Independent Offices Appropriations Act.”92 
The court holds that the decision to require a PTIN fee was not 
arbitrary and capricious.93  This fee does not fall outside of the IRS’s 
regulatory authority because “the fee is ‘based on direct costs of the 
PTIN program, which include staffing and contract-related costs for 
activities, processes, and procedures related to the electronic and 
paper registration and renewal submissions.’”94 
 
Impact: 
 
The impact of Montrois is the importance of the three factors that 
justify a fee under the Independent Offices Appropriations Act.  
Without meeting the three requirements of providing a service that 
yields a specific benefit to identifiable individuals, an agency could 
not justify its fee.  Here, the IRS did meet those requirements, and the 
PTIN fee was justifiable.   
 
ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY PILOTS ASSOCIATION V. UNITED STATES 
COAST GUARD 
357 F.Supp.3d 30 (D.C. Cir. 2019) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
The St. Lawrence Seaway Pilots Association sued the United 
States Coast Guard after the Coast Guard promulgated a rule that 
excluded legal fees as reimbursable if the fees were sustained in a 
suit against the United States government.  The pilots associations 
                                                          
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 1066. 
93 Id. at 1067. 
94 Id.  
    
180 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 39-1 
declared that the rule was arbitrary and capricious. The court agreed, 
stating that the Coast Guard did not acknowledge the change during 
the rulemaking, nor did it offer a reasoned explanation for the 
change.  The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs.  
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
In 1960, the Great Lakes Pilotage Act required foreign-owned 
shipping vessels to employ “registered, experienced American or 
Canadian seaway pilots to navigate American portions of the St. 
Lawrence Seaway or the Great Lakes.”95  The Secretary of Homeland 
Security was to set the rates, but delegated that to the Great Lakes 
Pilotage Office of the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard), 
“which has promulgated regulations establishing the methods by 
which rates are set.”96  The goal for the rates was to “‘promote safe, 
efficient, and reliable pilotage service on the Great Lakes, by 
generating for each pilotage association sufficient revenue to 
reimburse its necessary and reasonable operating expenses, fairly 
compensate trained and rested pilots, and provide an appropriate 
profit to use for improvements.’”97  Simply, the rates were to be 
necessary and reasonable.98 
However, in 2016, the Coast Guard changed the way that the 
rates were set.99  Similar to previous years, pilots would “detail their 
expenses,” which “obligates the Coast Guard to determine whether 
an expense is both ‘necessary’ for providing pilotage services and 
‘reasonable’ in amount.”100  But, “the new Rule treats legal fees 
incurred in litigation against the U.S. government differently than 
other legal fees.  Under the new regulation, ‘association [legal] 
expenses are recognizable except for any and all expenses associated 
with legal action against the U.S. government or its agents.’”101 
                                                          
95 St. Lawrence Seaway Pilots Association v. United States Coast Guard, 357 
F.Supp.3d 30, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 33.  
100 Id.  
101 Id. at 33–34. 
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When the Coast Guard “engaged in a notice-and-comment 
rulemaking to set rates for the 2017 shipping season,” the pilots 
associations requested the Coast Guard to recognize the legal 
expenses incurred from three years prior.102  Rulemaking was always 
based on expenses incurred three years prior.103  The Coast Guard 
responded that those costs were no longer covered.104  The pilots 
associations argued that the Coast Guard promulgated that rule in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner.105 
The court’s review of an agency action is narrow, and the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)  “precludes the court from 
‘substitu[ing] its judgment for that of the agency.’”106  Instead, the 
court must “determine whether the agency ‘examine[d] the relevant 
data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its actions, 
including a rational connection between the facts found and the 
choice made.’”107 
 
Holding: 
 
The holding in St. Lawrence Seaway Pilots Association hinges on 
the fact that during the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), the 
Coast Guard did not acknowledge “a significant overhaul of rate-
setting methodology.”108  When the pilots associations commented 
on the new methodology, the Coast Guard still did not acknowledge 
it in the final rulemaking.109  It responded to the pilots associations’ 
comments with “‘we disagree.’”110  The court states that “‘[a] central 
principle of administrative law is that, when an agency decides to 
depart from . . . past practices and official policies, the agency must 
                                                          
102 Id. at 34. 
103 Id.  
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 35.  
106 Id.  
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 36.  
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
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at a minimum acknowledge the change and offer a reasoned 
explanation for it.’”111 
The Coast Guard did not acknowledge the change or offer an 
explanation.112  The court highlighted that “[t]he fact that Plaintiffs 
were able to identify the change in policy does not absolve the Coast 
Guard of its obligation to engage in reasoned decision-making, which 
starts with acknowledging a deliberate change.”113  The court also 
iterates that it does not rule on whether or not the policy is wise, or 
needed.114  Instead, the way that the Coast Guard implemented the 
change was arbitrary and capricious.115  The pilots associations’ 
motion for summary judgment is granted.116 
 
Impact: 
 
The impact of this case is the reiteration of the procedure behind 
promulgating rules, and a reaffirmation that the court does not look at 
the substance or wisdom of the rules promulgated, but merely the 
procedure behind it.  The Coast Guard did not acknowledge its 
change in rules regarding reimbursement in the NPRM, and when the 
pilots associations commented regarding the lack of reimbursement 
for legal fees incurred against the United States, the Coast Guard 
stated that it disagreed.  The Coast Guard should have explained the 
rule change.  This is an example of the importance of following the 
procedures under the APA.   
 
W.G.A. V. SESSIONS 
900 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2018) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
W.G.A. was threatened by members of an El Salvadoran gang 
and fled to the United States.  He was caught and put into removal 
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proceedings, and then applied for asylum under Article 3 of the 
Convention Against Torture.  The immigration judge and the Board 
of Immigration Appeals denied his application.  The Seventh Circuit 
disagreed and remanded W.G.A.’s case back to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals on the basis that W.G.A. actually does qualify 
for asylum.   
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
In 2013, the rural community where W.G.A. grew up was 
infiltrated by the Mara 18 gang.117  The Mara 18 one of two 
dangerous street gangs in El Salvador.118  Between Mara 18 and MS-
13, these gangs “use violence to exercise an enormous degree of 
social control over their territories.”119  Both Mara 18 and MS-13 
have extorted millions, conducted labor strikes, controlled political 
campaigns, and are usually above the law.120  In 2014, W.G.A.’s 
younger brother, S.R.P., did not come home from the store.121  
Months later, W.G.A. received a call from S.R.P.122  S.R.P. was 
afraid that the gang was going to kill him and hung up without giving 
W.G.A. much information.123  W.G.A. and his mother did not contact 
the police, “because they felt it would be useless . . . Others had 
disappeared after reporting crimes to the police.”124  A few months 
later, S.R.P. was arrested, and at his court proceeding, he had a gang 
tattoo on his hand.125  Because S.R.P. did not want to be in the gang 
anymore, he did “not come home for fear of what the gang would 
do.”126  He did not tell his family where he was going.127  The day 
after S.R.P. disappeared, W.G.A. received a phone call from a man 
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who told him to “‘be careful’ and that ‘they’re looking for you.’”128  
The following day, “four tattooed gang members approached W.G.A. 
at his house.”129  After throwing W.G.A. to the ground and putting a 
gun to his head, one of the gang members said “‘if you don’t hand 
over your brother, you’re going to die here.’  The men told W.G.A. 
that he had four days to comply or they would kill him.”130  The men 
also threated to kill him and his family if they contacted the police.131  
Two days after this incident, W.G.A. fled to the United States 
because he was afraid that the gang members would kill him.132  The 
gang members continued to threaten W.G.A.’s family, and W.G.A.’s 
other brother went into hiding.133 
Upon arriving in the United States through Texas, W.G.A. was 
apprehended and the Department of Homeland Security “initiated 
removal proceedings against him.”134  W.G.A. “conceded that he was 
removable . . . [but] applied for asylum.”135  Both the immigration 
judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals found that “W.G.A. did 
not qualify for any of his asserted grounds of relief and ordered 
removal.”136 
This court had to determine what the scope of review was when 
deciding this case, which hinged on whether or not “the Board’s 
order is independent of or supplemented the immigration judge’s 
decision.”137  Because the Board’s order was supplementary to the 
immigration judge’s decision, this court can “review the immigration 
judge’s findings as supplemented by the Board’s.”138 
“To qualify for asylum, W.G.A. must show that he is ‘unable or 
unwilling to return’ to El Salvador ‘because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution’ . . . ‘on account of’ one of five protected 
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grounds: ‘race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.’”139  Here, W.G.A has shown that 
Mara 18 has persecuted him in the past.140  However, the issue is 
“whether the persecution was motivated by a reason covered by the 
asylum statutes.”141  W.G.A. claims that he was targeted by Mara 18 
because of “his membership in two particular social groups: (1) 
members of his nuclear family or (2) family members of tattooed 
former Salvadoran gang members.”142  While the immigration judge 
and the Board did not believe that W.G.A.’s persecution was directly 
connected to his membership in these groups, the court here holds 
that W.G.A. has “identified a cognizable social group and that the 
record compels the conclusion that the Mara 18 persecuted him on 
account of his membership in it.”143 
 
Holding: 
 
The immigration judge and the Board both found that W.G.A. 
was a part of the cognizable social group of “members of his nuclear 
family.”144  Because the membership element was met, the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit does not “resolve the Chevron 
question regarding the family members of former gang members.”145  
Secondly, the court found that W.G.A.’s membership in his family 
was “one central reason for the persecution that both sides agree he 
suffered.”146  The court goes on to highlight W.G.A.’s testimony as 
well as country reports that “corroborate this testimony and 
demonstrate widespread recognition that the Salvadoran gangs target 
nuclear family units to enforce their orders and to discourage 
defection.”147  Specifically, a “report by the U.S. Department of State 
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says that ‘the families of gang members often face the same risks of 
being killed or disappearing as the gang members themselves.”148 
Lastly, the court concluded that under Article 3 of the Convention 
Against Torture, W.G.A. would “not have to show that the torture 
relates to any protected grounds.  But the torture must be ‘inflicted by 
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official.’”149  Therefore, the court here remands W.G.A.’s claim for 
deferred removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture 
because W.G.A. has shown that he has been tortured in the past, and 
it will continue in the future.150  The standard does not require a 
public official to be directly involved, but country reports show that 
there is an extensive record regarding corruption within the 
government of El Salvador.151  In conclusion, W.G.A.’s case was 
remanded.  
 
Impact: 
 
One of the impacts of W.G.A. is the idea that when the Board of 
Immigration issues an opinion that is supplementary to the 
immigration judge’s decision, the appellate court can examine not 
only the Board of Immigration’s holding, but also the immigration 
judge’s opinion.  This ultimately gets decided on a case by case basis, 
but it expands the scope of review of the appellate court.  
Furthermore, a factual finding on an asylum claim can only be 
reversed by a Court of Appeals if “the evidence compels a different 
result” which was the case here in W.G.A.152 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 
 
HADWAN V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
340 F.Supp.3d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
The Department of State revoked Mansoor Hadwan’s passport 
and his Consular Report of Birth Abroad.  Under the Mandamus and 
the Administrative Procedures Act, Hadwan sought to supplement 
the administrative record with evidence about the State Department’s 
proxy denaturalization program.  Because the court found that the 
State Department did not act in bad faith, and because there was no 
other particularized need, Hadwan’s motion was denied. 
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
In June 2013, Mansoor Hadwan went to the United States 
Embassy in Sana’a, Yemen.153  He was applying for immigration 
benefits for his family.154  However, when he was there, Hadwan 
says that officials at the Embassy took his passport and his U.S. 
Consular Report of Birth Abroad (CRBA).155  He alleges that 
“Embassy officials conditioned the return of his passport and CRBA 
on his completion of a number of forms.”156  Hadwan filled out the 
forms and says that he was told the documents would be sent to 
him.157  In March 2014, Hadwan was told that his passport and 
CRBA were revoked because “the forms he executed included 
admissions that his biological father was not a U.S. citizen and that 
he had lied on his passport and CRBA applications.”158  Hadwan, 
who does not speak or write English, claimed that these statements 
were coerced and that “he did not understand what he was 
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signing.”159  A few months later, in August 2014, there was a 
revocation hearing held by the State Department, but Hadwan could 
not attend because “he was denied a one-time passport to attend that 
hearing.”160  Hadwan’s attorney argued that “Hadwan did not sign 
the form voluntarily” but the Government rebutted that claim with 
the fact that “the document stated that it ‘was read to me in Arabic 
and I understood the contents completely.’”161  In March 2015, the 
State Department found that “Hadwan admitted to supplying false 
information in his passport and CRBA applications and affirmed 
their revocation.”162 
Once his passport and CRBA were revoked, Hadwan sought to 
supplement the administrative record under the Mandamus Act and 
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).163  Hadwan wanted to add 
evidence “concerning ‘the implementation of the State Department’s 
proxy denaturalization program and consulate decisions . . . .’”164  
Hadwan believed that “the administrative record is ‘devoid of any 
record of how and why the Department of State decided that [he] was 
not who he purported to be.’”165  Hadwan also believed that there 
were illegal coercions and interrogations by agency employees and 
that the Department of State was “strip[ping] passports from 
American citizens in Yemen.”166 
The Government argued that “Hadwan has not ‘made a strong 
showing or demonstrated a particularized need for the extra-record 
discovery . . . nor has be demonstrated the existence of any of the 
narrow and rare circumstances under which discovery may be 
appropriate against the government in an APA review case.’”167  
Furthermore, the Government argued that “a court reviewing an 
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agency decision is confined to the administrative record compiled by 
that agency when it made the decision.”168 
 
Holding: 
 
The holding in Hadwan was based off of the premise that there 
are two categories in which the administrative record can be 
supplemented.169  The first reason is “‘the party may seek to show 
that materials exist that were actually considered by the agency 
decision-makers but are not in the record as filed.’”170  The second is 
that a “party may seek extra-record evidence” upon a “strong 
showing in support of a claim of bad faith or improper behavior on 
the part of the agency decision makers or where the absence of 
formal administrative findings makes such investigation necessary . . 
. to determine the reasons for the . . . decision.’”171  Hadwan’s motion 
to supplement the administrative record was ultimately denied 
because his reasons did not fall into either of these categories.172  
Courts will not “‘ascribe . . . nefarious motives to agency action as a 
general matter.”173  The court then discusses a couple of exceptions, 
one being that the administrative record can be supplemented if the 
“evidentiary record is inadequate, but those materials must merely be 
explanatory of the original record and should advance no new 
rationalizations.”174  Also, the court holds that it will allow for 
background information “when confronted with complex issues or to 
determine whether the agency considered all relevant factors in 
making its decision.”175  Hadwan “offer[ed] nothing more than bare 
assertions that the statement was coerced.”176  Ultimately, the court 
held that there needs to be a “strong showing of bad faith to warrant 
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extra-record discovery or record supplementation.”177  The court 
“will not assume an agency acted in bad faith simply because it 
exercised its discretion.”178 
 
Impact: 
 
The full impact of Hadwan is yet to be realized.  However, the 
important conclusion from this case is that the court needs a showing 
that an agency is acting in bad faith.  Without that showing, the court 
will side with the agency and defer to its discretion.  Here, there was 
no showing that the State Department acted in bad faith, so the court 
denied Hadwan’s motion to supplement the administrative record.  
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STATE APPELLATE COURTS 
 
LAPERCHE V. CITY OF PEEKSKILL 
162 A.D.3d 665 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
Douglas LaPerche was a police officer in the City of Peekskill.  
Officer LaPerche had sustained injuries that caused him to be out of 
work.  He applied for benefits because his absence was related to a 
prior injury.  The Chief of Police denied the application due to 
procedural errors in Officer Peekskill’s request.  The court ruled that 
denying these benefits based solely on procedural grounds was an 
abuse of discretion.  
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
Officer Douglas LaPerche, during his time as a police officer in 
the City of Peekskill, sustained injuries on September 18, 2011 and 
December 24, 2012.179   Officer LaPerche reported both of these 
injuries and received benefits each time under General Municipal 
Law section 207-c.180  However, a couple of years later, on May 23, 
2015, Officer LaPerche said that he would be out of work until June 
10, 2015 until he had seen his orthopedist.181  He applied for benefits 
because “his absence was related to the prior injuries sustained on 
September 18. 2011, and December 24, 2012.”182  However, the 
Chief of Police of the City of Peekskill denied the application 
because “the petitioner failed to follow the procedures relating to the 
application for such benefits as outlined in the collective bargaining 
agreement between the petitioner’s union and the respondent.”183  
Officer LaPerche was required to submit a report within 24 hours of 
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the incident which “gave rise to the disability.”184  However, the 
incident was years before.   
Judicial review of an administrative determination is “limited to 
the question of whether the determination was ‘made in violation of 
lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary 
and capricious or an abuse of discretion.’”185  The court also states 
that a “determination is arbitrary and capricious if it lacks a rational 
basis.”186 
 
Holding: 
 
Here, the court found that the “failure to submit an incident report 
within the 24-hour time limit may be excused by the respondent ‘in 
appropriate cases.’”187 The court argued that under these 
circumstances, “it was arbitrary and capricious for the respondent not 
to offer the petitioner the opportunity to seek to excuse any technical 
violations of these procedures.”188  It would be an abuse of discretion 
to deny Officer LaPerche’s application for benefits due to a 
procedural error alone.189 
 
Impact: 
 
The impact of LaPerche is the reaffirmation that an 
administrative determination is arbitrary and capricious if it lacks a 
rational basis.  Here, there was no rational basis for denying Officer 
LaPerche’s application based on a procedural error.  Furthermore, 
judicial review of an administrative determination is limited to 
whether or not the decision was based on an error of law or if there 
was an abuse of discretion.  The judicial branch is not provided much 
leeway in examining administrative decisions.  
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